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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8181

JAY D. FERRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jay D. Ferry was convicted of the offense of carnal
knowledge and sentenced to a term of not to exceed five
years in the Utah State Penitentiary. From the conviction
and sentence, he appeals.
The complaining witness, mother of one June Peer,
the person against whom the criminal act was committed,
and the said June Peer failed to appear at the trial (R. 2).
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The trial court refused a motion by the State for a continuance which was based upon the absence of these witnesses (R. 2). Thereafter, the court, in the absence of the
jury, considered the State's offer of proof including the
voluntariness of the confession of the defendant, (Exhibit
1) the proffered proof of the corpus delicti, and the defendant's objections thereto (R. 6 to 101). The court then
ruled thereupon (R. 101 to 103). The trial resumed .in the
presence of the jury and the State called as its first witness
Lillian Webb Taylor (R. 104). Mrs. Taylor testified that
she had known since birth (June 27, 1938) one June Peer
(R. 105). A certified copy of the birth certificate of June
Peer was, by stipulation of counsel, accepted in evidence
(R. 105). Culbert Robison, County Sheriff, was re-called
as a witness for the State (R. 106). Sheriff Robison testified that he was acquainted with the defendant and had
known the defendant for about two years; (R. 106, 107)
that he was present at the County Attorney's office in Delta,
Utah, during a conversation had on July 30th, 1953, between the defendant and June Peer in the presence of the
County Attorney and himself; (R. 107, 108) the sheriff
testified that during this conversation June Peer related an
act of intercourse had by herself with the defendant; (R.
109) that she, June Peer, said to the defendant, "Isn't that
right, Jay?" And Jay said, "Yes" (R. 110). The witness
thereafter testified as to further details of the conversation
and to the statements of June Peer and the defendant as to
the act of intercourse, the particular place where it was
consummated and as to the State's Exhibit 1, the confession
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of the defendant (R. 110 to 139). It was stipulated that
the offense took place in Millard County (R. 126).

0. J. Bennet, Deputy Sheriff, was called as a witness
for the State (R. 140). The deputy testified that he was
acquainted with the defendant, (R. 140) and that he had
contacted the defendant officially and told him to stay away
from June Peer;"* * * I told him he better stay away
from her, to leave her alone * * *" (R. 141). The witness further testified that he was present in the County
Attorney's office when the defendant confessed to the offense and as to the circumstances thereof ; ( R. 142 to 146)
that he witnessed the defendant's signature thereto (R.
144).
The State's Exhibit 1, confession of the defendant, was
introduced in evidence and read to the jury (R. 146 to 150).
The State rests (R. 150).
Defendant's motion to· dismiss the charge was overruled and denied (R. 151, 152).
John H. Ferry, the father of Jay Ferry, was called as
a witness for the defense (R. 153). The witness testified
as to the defendant's educational background; (R. 153,
154) as to the preliminary hearing; (R. 154, 155) as to
events following the hearing (R. 155 to 157). The defendant was called on his own behalf (R. 157). He testified
as to his educational background; (R. 157) as to his apprehension on or about July 22nd, 1953; (R. 158) as to the
circumstances surrounding his confession and as to its
subsequent amendment; (R. 158 to 162) that he was in fear
that if he did not sign the confession he would be returned
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to prison for violation of parole (R. 162, 163). There was
adduced from the witness no evidence of the nature of a
former committed offense. On cross-examination, the defendant testified that he had not read the full context of his
confession; (R. 163) that there were parts of it he did not
understand; (R. 164 to 166) that he did not remember
whether the statement (confession) had been read to him
or not; (R. 166) that, "The statement wasn't read to me"
(R. 167). The witness further testified that he discussed
the contents of the confession with June Peer and that he
"corrected" it by writing on the margin thereof (R. 167 to
170). The defense rests (R. 170).
The jury returned its verdict and found the defendant
guilty of carnal knowledge of a female under the age of
eighteen years and over the age of thirteen years as charged
in the information.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CORPUS
DELICTI.
ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CORPUS
DELICTI.
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The only question here to be determined is : Was there
sufficient evidence introduced upon the trial to establish
the "corpus delicti" of the crime of carnal knowledge to
that degree necessary before the confession of the defendant could be received in evidence? Lack of such evidence
is the sole error complained of by appellant.
Appellant contends that it is essential that the corpus
delicti should be established fully and completely by evidence independent of the confession before the latter could
properly be received in evidence. We concede that a confession alone is not sufficient to establish the fact that a
crime has been committed, but we respectfully contend that
it may be competent evidence of that fact. Where, as in this
case, there are corroborative circumstances, the confession
may be considered with such circumstances to establish. the
corpus delicti of the crime. For this contention we direct
the court's attention to the following authorities:
"Proof of the corpus delicti may be by circumstantial evidence. Where defendant has confessed
commission of the crime, the confession may be considered in connection with other evidence to establish the corpus delicti and it is sufficient if it is
corroborated by other evidence. * * *"

State v. DeHart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N. W. 2d 360; Phillips v.
State, 196 Miss. 194, 16 So. 2d 630.
"While a voluntary confession is insufficient,
standing alone, to prove that a crime has been committed, it is, nevertheless, competent evidence of
that fact, and may, with slight corroborative circumstances, establish the corpus delicti as well as
the defendant's guilty participation."
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Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N. W. 721.
"The rule requiring corroboration of a confession is met if the additional evidence is sufficient
to convince the jury that the crime charged is real
and not imaginary."

Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 285 P. 766. See also, Short v.
People, 27 Colo. 175, 60 P. 350; 7 Wigmore on Evidence
(3d Ed.) §§ 2070, 2071.
The rule is that the law demands, and only demands,
the best proof of the corpus delicti which, in the nature of
the case, is attainable. State v. Ramo, 185 P. 2d 757, 767.
This court in State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010,
concerned itself with the identical question here presented
as to whether there was sufficient independent proof of
the corpus delicti to render a confession admissable in evidence. That case would appear to make clear, every such
question must necessarily be determined in the light of the
particular facts of the case. It is there held, however, that:

"* * * the corroborating fact or facts need
not independently of the confession conclusively
prove the corpus delicti."
In the later case of State v. Cronk, et al., ... Utah ... , 142
P. 2d 178, 183, this court affirmed the rule as stated in
State v. Johnson, supra, and went on to say:
"Of course, in some cases, the proof of the corpus delicti may bring in the confession, because the
confession itself is so linked in time and place with
the commission of the offense that as a practical
matter the proof of the two are not segregable."
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The corpus delicti in a prosecution for carnal knowledge
is the substantial fact of intercourse, and a confession may
render sufficient circumstantial evidence that would be insufficient without it. See Watson v. State, (Texas) 227
S. W. 2d 559 and Preston v. State, (Texas) 242 S. W. 2d
436.
For the case at bar, what is there in the evidence outside of the confession to establish the act of intercourse?
Subsequent to making the confession, the appellant admitted to the act; the scene of the crime was established
and stipulated to; it was shown that appellant had been
warned to stay away from and leave alone the victim. Further, the appellant desired to marry the victim; appellant
had employed counsel ; he discussed the details of his confession with the victim and made corrections thereto. All
of which was sufficient evidence to convince the jury that
the crime charged was real and not imaginary and which,
when permissably coupled with the confession, was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.
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CONCLUSION
We believe that the rights of persons accused of crime
should be zealously guard,ed. We do not believe that rules
of evidence promulgated tq protect such rights should be
extended to constitute a fortress impregnable to justice.
The conviction and sentence should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
PATRICK H. FENTON,
District Attorney (5th District),
Attorneys for Respondent.
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